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Financial turbulence and distress charac-
terized much of the 1990s. The decade began
with Europe’s exchange-rate crisis of 1992–93
and by 2000 had witnessed two more major
financial crises. The unexpected financial melt-
down of Mexico, known as the Tequila Crisis,
began with the peso devaluation in December
1994. This crisis quickly spread to other Latin
American countries. The Asian crisis started with
Thailand devaluing its currency in July 1997,
reached neighboring countries (Malaysia, Indo-
nesia, Philippines, and South Korea) by the end
of the year, then spread to Russia in 1998 and to
Brazil in 1999. Even though the causes of the
crises varied in each country, the Tequila Crisis
and the Asian crisis have a commonality defined
by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) as a twin crisis
—a case when currency and banking woes are
linked together. A twin crisis is far more severe
than when currency and banking problems
occur separately.
These unexpected and severe crises
prompted much research that focused mainly
on their sources.1 By identifying the sources,
researchers hoped to identify long-term solu-
tions as well as to predict financial meltdowns.2
In the endeavor to find the root causes of the
Asian crisis, two hypotheses surfaced: the weak-
fundamentals view and the financial-panic view,
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.3
Each hypothesis has policy implications for the
management as well as the prevention of future
crises.4
According to the weak-fundamentals view,
a country’s weakness in macroeconomic or finan-
cial fundamentals, or both, causes the sudden
reversal of capital flows, and major structural
reforms and commitment to continue those re-
forms are necessary to solve the problems.5 The
weak-fundamentals view predicts a slow recov-
ery, because it takes time to recognize bank and
corporate losses and to allocate the losses
among creditors (Dooley 1999).
The financial-panic view considers a crisis
as no more than the reaction of nervous markets
(Radelet and Sachs 1998, Marshall 1998, and
Chang and Velasco 1999). The eruption of a cri-
sis is a shift from one equilibrium to another,
and the recovery process is a shift back to the
original equilibrium in a model with multiple
equilibria. Reducing the cost of coordination
failure among lenders is of utmost importance.
To restore market confidence, countries need
orderly rescheduling of debt and international
cooperation. The financial-panic view expects a
fast return to the precrisis economy after market
confidence is restored.
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The recovery process of the Asian crisis
countries shows, however, that neither of these
theories has effectively addressed the recovery
process, especially crisis management. When ex-
amining the weak-fundamentals view, it is strik-
ing that the recoveries started before the im-
plementation of major structural reforms. The
financial-panic view cannot explain the scale of
nonperforming loans that still make the coun-
tries vulnerable to shocks. According to this
view, a short-term debt rescheduling and an
injection of ample capital by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), even without huge struc-
tural reform, would drive an economy back to
the original equilibrium. This has not been the
case because the economies have not returned
to their original equilibria.
It is important to note that these theories
do not provide systematic guidance in block-
ing a self-reinforcing downward spiral, which
occurs after a country is hit by a twin crisis.6
Rather than providing insight into the recovery
process, these theories seem better suited for
suggesting ways of putting the economy into a
sustainable economic growth track or building a
stable international financial system for the long
run. As we see from the experience of Thailand
and Indonesia in the wake of the Asian crisis,
solutions to restore market confidence for the
long run, such as closing troubled financial
institutions and abruptly cutting back govern-
ment expenditure on food subsidies, can exacer-
bate the economic and political conditions and
deepen the banking crisis.
A desirable financial-crisis model should
give policy suggestions for handling a down-
ward spiral as well as an explanation for the
causes of a financial crisis. In this article, we
investigate the determinants of the recovery by
focusing on market reactions and government
policy in the hope that it will formulate a better
financial-crisis model. The recovery process, how-
ever, differs country by country, depending on the
country’s economic fundamentals, institutional
factors, and the world economic conditions at
the time of the crisis. Even though countries
may have similar GDP growth rates during the
recovery period, other economic variables such
as domestic credit growth, inflation, and real-
wage growth rate may vary. The study of recov-
ery requires careful investigation of each coun-
try’s experience before theorizing the process in
general. We chose South Korea (referred to as
Korea hereafter) as our first country to research
because it has demonstrated the fastest recovery
among the Asian countries by blocking its
downward spiral (Figure 1 ).
BRIEF REVIEW OF THE EVENTS 
IN 1997 AND EARLY 1998
In hindsight, the Korean economy had
problems, which we may identify as the sources
of the crisis. For four decades before the crisis,
the Korean government managed economic
growth by allocating capital among big con-
glomerates, called chaebols,7 and small and
medium-size companies. The government con-
trolled the allocation of financial resources by
managing both the commercial banks and the
state-owned special banks. The bond and
equity markets were relatively underdeveloped,
so the banking system generally carried out
financial intermediation.
The collusive link among the Korean gov-
ernment, chaebols and the banking industry
resulted in inadequate financial supervision and
regulations and inefficient use of capital.8 The
merchant banks, some of which were owned by
chaebols, had less regulation than the commer-
cial banks.9 As a result of the chaebols’ aggres-
sive expansion and lax financial supervision, the
debt/equity ratio of the thirty major chaebols
was 500 percent.10 In January 1997, Korea’s sec-
ond largest steelmaker, Hanbo Iron and Steel,
was unable to honor its promissory notes, thus
forcing it into bankruptcy. The collapse of other
mid-size chaebols, such as Kia Motor, Jinro, and
Haitai, followed in early 1997. The weakness of
Figure 1
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the Korean financial and corporate sector had
become obvious.
The revealed weakness of the Korean
economy along with the speculative attack on the
Thai baht exposed the merchant banks’ liquid-
ity problems. Since early 1997, Korean merchant
banks were having difficulty rolling over their
short-term dollar loans. This difficulty was more
profound in Korea than in any other Asian
country (Ito 1999). Korea’s ratio of short-term
foreign borrowing to foreign exchange reserves
was 285 percent, far above the ratios of other
Asian countries. For example, Thailand had a
135 percent ratio and the Philippines, 105 per-
cent. The Korean government offered incentives
to domestic banks and large private companies
to borrow in foreign currencies for industrial
development. The result was severe maturity
and currency mismatches: The foreign borrow-
ings were short-term, while the domestic loans
were for long-term investments, and the foreign
borrowings were in foreign currencies.11
The merchant banks’ difficulties penetrated
the commercial banks as a crisis erupted in
Thailand. The Japanese banks, which were suffer-
ing from their lending in Southeast Asia and
their growing nonperforming domestic loans,
were major players in a widespread withdrawal
of loans.12 Foreign loans to Korea by Japanese
financial institutions dropped from $21.9 billion
at the end of 1996 to $8.8 billion by the end 
of 1997. In response, the Korean government
announced on August 25, 1997, that it was com-
mitted to providing financial support to com-
mercial and merchant banks and would ensure
repayment of all Korean financial institutions’
foreign debt liabilities. The markets, however,
did not respond to the commitment of a foreign
debt guarantee. The inability to roll over short-
term loans triggered runs in the Korean cur-
rency markets. The Korean won began a free
fall and depreciated 25 percent in late November
from its precrisis level against the U.S. dollar
(Figure 2 ). Currency market intervention left
less than $6 billion in usable foreign exchange
reserves when the IMF intervened.
On December 4, 1997, the IMF approved
a $58.4 billion standby arrangement to build 
foreign exchange reserves. This rescue plan in-
cluded a range of structural reforms in the finan-
cial and corporate sectors to address what the
IMF believed to be the causes of the crisis.
President-elect Dae-jung Kim approved the IMF
reform package, and a tight monetary policy fol-
lowed immediately. As a result, the overnight
call rate shot up to 25 percent (Figure 2 ).
The currency market turbulence quickly
crushed the banking sector. By early 1998, most
commercial banks and other financial institu-
tions were in technical default due to the severe
depreciation and high interest rates. Damage to
the economy by the twin crisis and the tight
monetary policy was substantial. Real GDP
shrank 8.1 percent in the third quarter of 1998
compared with the previous year (Table 1).
CRISIS MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND MARKETS
Currency Markets
In managing a twin crisis, stabilization of
the currency market has highest priority because
banking sector turmoil cannot be controlled
without currency market stabilization. At 13 per-
cent of Korea’s GDP, the size of the IMF standby
loan to stop a self-reinforcing cycle of capital
outflow was unprecedented in the IMF’s his-
tory.13 However, the announcement of the IMF
program on December 4, 1997, had a minimal
immediate effect on the currency market. The won
depreciated further (50 percent of the precrisis
level) after the announcement. Since the short-
term private debt was so large—about $70 bil-
lion, twice that of the official foreign reserves in
mid-1997— the fear was that relying only on the
market for a solution was simply too risky. The
currency market started to stabilize only after a
temporary agreement to maintain exposure was
reached with private bank creditors and discus-
sions on voluntary rescheduling of short-term
debt were initiated in late December 1997. The
U.S. Treasury’s role in attaining this nonmarket
solution was significant. As Radelet and Sachs
(1998) point out, the coordination of creditors
by the U.S. government represented a change in
the IMF policy. In Indonesia and Thailand, the
IMF had used a loan package together with
Figure 2
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economic reforms in the hope of returning mar-
ket confidence without using nonmarket solu-
tions. In January 1998, the Korean government
converted $24 billion of short-term private debt
(mostly by commercial and merchant banks)
into claims of one- to three-year maturities with
government guarantees. The new arrangements
halted the won’s fall.
To limit capital flight in the wake of the
currency crisis, the IMF plan supported a tight
monetary policy. The plan assumed that the re-
sultant high interest rates would increase the
cost of capital flight and reduce the pressure on
the foreign exchange market. The belief was
that if left unchecked, exchange rate overshooting
would trigger a depreciation– inflation spiral.
The continued depreciation could impose sub-
stantial burdens on both the corporate and bank-
ing sectors, which were already suffering from
overexposure to foreign-currency-denominated
liabilities. This more traditional way of handling
exchange market overshooting kept interest
rates high for several months until the tight
monetary policy was eased following stabiliza-
tion of the foreign exchange market (Figure 2 ).
The tight monetary policy severely reduced
economic activity. In the third quarter of 1998,
private consumption dropped 12.5 percent and
private investment decreased 22.4 percent from
the previous year. The change in real GDP, –8.1
percent in the third quarter, was considerably
larger than the IMF’s initial estimate of 2 to 3 per-
cent in 1998 (Table 1 ). Many economists ques-
tioned the appropriateness of a tight monetary
policy. The IMF argued that vulnerabilities of the
Korean corporate and banking sectors to either
an interest rate shock or an exchange rate shock
were so great that either could have seriously
damaged the real economy (Lissakers 1999).
There was a growing sentiment among critics of
the IMF plan that in the short run, tightening
money was not effective in stabilizing the for-
eign exchange market. They argued that since
the Korean government controlled capital out-
flow reasonably well and the Korean bond 
market had negligible foreign investment, a
tight monetary policy would have a minimal
positive effect.14
An empirical study by Cho and West (1999)
shows that a 1 percent increase in interest rates
Table 1
Real Domestic Product and Related Measures
Gross fixed
Private capital
GDP consumption formation Exports Imports
growth Inflation growth growth growth growth
1996 1Q 7.1 5.9 7.6 6.1 20.3 16.8
2Q 6.8 4.4 7.7 5.5 3.5 6.7
3Q 6.5 2.9 6.0 9.3 –7.8 7.7
4Q 6.7 2.8 7.1 8.2 2.1 14.4
1997 1Q 4.9 1.8 4.5 .8 –5.6 3.9
2Q 6.2 1.6 4.4 2.2 7.1 .8
3Q 5.5 2.4 5.3 –3.6 15.6 –3.8
4Q 3.6 6.2 –1.0 –7.2 3.6 –14.8
1998 1Q –4.6 11.9 –11.9 –19.9 8.4 –36.2
2Q –8.0 6.3 –13.3 –23.9 –1.8 –37.0
3Q –8.1 4.1 –12.5 –22.4 –10.8 –39.9
4Q –5.9 –.5 –9.2 –18.3 –5.5 –28.7
1999 1Q 5.4 –5.6 7.9 –4.6 –6.1 8.1
2Q 10.8 –3.5 10.9 4.2 2.5 22.2
3Q 12.8 –.4 12.4 6.7 15.1 38.7
4Q 13.0 1.2 12.8 7.2 22.7 44.8
2000 1Q 12.8 –.5 10.8 21.9 29.8 51.9
2Q 9.7 –.9 8.9 13.2 21.5 38.4
3Q 9.2 –2.4 5.7 10.5 26.5 35.8
4Q 4.6 –2.1 3.2 1.6 6.1 16.2
NOTE: Year-over-year percentage change.
SOURCE: Statistics-Korea.
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results in a 1 percent increase in the won/dollar
rate. They point out that the 20 percent increase
in interest rates was not enough to offset the 80
percent increase in the won/dollar rate. Park
and Choi (1999) show that the effect of interest
rates on exchange rates is small and statistically
insignificant.
Korea’s foreign liquidity position rose as
its domestic demand collapsed (Table 1 ), re-
sulting in a 1998 current account surplus of $50
billion (12 percent of GDP). This surplus helped
reduce the net foreign debt (foreign debt minus
foreign loans) from $54.1 billion in December
1997 to $20.2 billion in December 1998.15 Even
though high interest rates were not the only rea-
son for the collapse of domestic demand, they
did dramatically reduce domestic investment
and personal consumption. Tight monetary pol-
icy and capital market liberalization, which
allowed foreigners to buy Korean securities, did
not greatly increase foreign ownership of
Korean equity and corporate bonds. In 1998,
net foreign capital inflow to the Korean equity
market was $4.7 billion. Net foreign ownership
of Korean government and commercial bonds
was $0.8 billion.
In summary, the short-term debt resched-
uling, the IMF bailout, and the collapse of im-
port demand following a tight monetary policy
stabilized the currency market. The tight mone-
tary policy stabilized the market primarily by
severely reducing domestic economic activity.
Credit Markets
Crisis economies tend to have downward
spirals. These spirals begin with defaults in the
banking sector and subsequent increases in
nonperforming loans, thus making loans to cor-
porations more unlikely and deepening the
recession overall. Therefore, after stabilizing the
currency market, blocking the downward spiral
becomes a major policy objective of twin crisis
management. To achieve this, the private sector
must have access to credit markets, and individ-
ual companies must reduce their financial stress
by cutting costs.
Bank Loans. Since bank loans are the major
source of private credit in most non-Western
economies, the trend in private bank credit is a
key indicator of the credit conditions in these
economies. The spiral of corporate defaults and
decreasing loans lasted less than a year in Korea
(Figure 3 and Table 2 ). In 1998, real lending by
commercial banks to the private sector declined
9.7 percent to households and 2.9 percent to
firms. In 1999, overall lending by commercial
banks to the private sector jumped 26.9 percent
in real terms. Korea was able to contain its
downward spiral by effectively sustaining bank
credits to the private sector. This feature of re-
covery is notable when we compare bank lend-
ing in crisis countries (Figure 4 ).16
Korea’s ability to contain its downward
spiral has a lot to do with the government’s 
traditional role as a moderator in the financial
market. Shortly after the beginning of the IMF
program, two major commercial banks—Korea
First Bank and Seoul Bank—were nationalized
rather than closed. They required a large capital
injection of about 5 percent of GDP. While capi-
tal flight was occurring in 1997, the government
announced full deposit guarantees for all finan-
cial institutions.17 This policy, together with the
nationalization of commercial banks and Korea’s
fiscal health, prevented runs in the financial 
sector. Precrisis Korea had a low government
debt/GDP ratio of less than 20 percent. Even
though the IMF program emphasized the role 
of private funds in the recapitalization and re-
structuring of financial institutions, public funds
constituted a majority of the money used for
these purposes.
About half of the first round of public
Table 2
Change of Lending by Commercial Banks to the Korean Private Sector
Percent change
’95/ ’94 ’96/ ’95 ’97/ ’96 ’98/ ’97 ’99/ ’98
Total 4.7 11.8 9.6 –4.8 26.9
Firms 4.6 10.1 8.3 –2.9 20.1
Households 5.2 16.4 12.9 –9.7 44.8
SOURCE: The Bank of Korea.
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funds, 32.5 trillion won ($25 billion, 7.2 percent
of 1997 GDP) was used to purchase nonper-
forming loans. Korea Asset Management Corpora-
tion (KAMCO) played a central role in loan 
consolidation. Deposit payment, recapitaliza-
tion, and loss coverage had cost 31.5 trillion
won ($24 billion, 7.0 percent of 1997 GDP).
The nationalization of commercial banks
and centralized purchasing of nonperforming
loans enabled the government to control most
of the financial institutions’ decisionmaking pro-
cess. Through its administrative powers, the
Financial Supervisory Commission pressured
the commercial banks to roll over all existing
debt of small and medium-size firms until the
end of 1998. From July to November 1998, 89.3
percent of loans to small and medium-size firms
were rolled over, accounting for 52 trillion won
($40 billion), or 36 percent of total loans to
firms. Furthermore, the government “encour-
aged” the banks to lower loan rates to small and
medium-size firms and to relax conditions on
bank loans. The banks’ progress in supporting
small and medium-size firms was regularly moni-
tored and reported. As a result, the ratio of loans
to small and medium-size firms to total loans to
firms increased from 62.6 percent (December
1997) to 64.7 percent (December 1998) and 66.4
percent (October 1999). Considering that credit
to small firms generally contracts relative to
large firms during recessions and periods of
tight monetary conditions (Gertler and Gilchrist
1994), the increased ratio in Korea is notable.
The average nominal loan rate to small and
medium-size companies dropped below precri-
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sis level (from 13.27 percent in November 1997
to 12.43 percent in November 1998).18
Capital Markets. Development of diversi-
fied funding sources can soften the shock of a
credit crunch. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan noted: “Downward spirals can be
contained with less damage when corporations
find alternative funding sources outside the
weakened financial sector. When American banks
seized up in 1990 as a consequence of a col-
lapse in the value of real estate collateral, the
capital market, largely unaffected by the decline
in values, was able to substitute for the loss of
bank financial intermediation. Likewise, when
public capital markets in the United States dried
up following the Russian default of August 1998,
dramatic restoration was possible because com-
mercial banks replaced the intermediation func-
tion of the public capital markets” (Greenspan
1999).
Korea’s credit crunch was mild compared
with those in other crisis-struck countries partly
because Korea did not remain solely dependent
on its banking sector. In 1998, it countered the
reduction of bank loans with commercial bond
issues. As a result, the overall direct financing of
corporations and lending did not decline
(Figure 5 ). However, Korea’s alternative fund-
ing sources did not stem from sound economic
fundamentals. Commercial paper composes a
minor portion of corporate financing in Korea.
But as fresh loans dried up, the conglomerates
issued commercial papers extensively to avoid
defaults. In 1998, net commercial paper issues
jumped 154 percent from the year before and
outpaced the decrease in bank loans (Figure 5 ).
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Real Commercial Bank Lending 
to the Private Sector
Index, quarter of crisis = 100
Quarters after crisis
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
161514131211109876543210
Thailand
Russia
Mexico
Korea
Indonesia
Brazil
SOURCES: International Financial Statistics, International
Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations.
Figure 5
Bank Loans, Commercial Papers, 
and Equity Issues
Unit = trillion won in 1995 price
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
’99’98’97’96’95
Equity issues
Net commercial papers
Commercial bank loans
SOURCE: Financial Supervisory Service, Korea.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS30
With a too-big-to-fail mentality, the invest-
ment trust firms, which were under competitive
pressure and lax supervision, bought the con-
glomerates’ commercial papers, of which Daewoo
was the major issuer. The government was slow
in supervising the excessive issuance until the
end of 1998.
The technical default of Daewoo triggered
the 1999 crisis of investment trust firms. This cri-
sis involved the classic elements of a financial
crisis: liberalization, lax financial supervision, and
moral hazards.19 As a consequence, the com-
mercial paper market collapsed and new com-
mercial paper issues dried up. By 1999, the net
issue of commercial paper was negative.20 In the
fall of 2000, as the due date for the commercial
papers issued in 1998 and 1999 neared, the gov-
ernment organized a 20 trillion won ($15.4 bil-
lion, 4.1 percent of 1999 GDP) capital-market
stabilization fund to bail out the medium-size
conglomerates that did not have credit to roll
over their commercial papers.
Equity Markets. In 1999, after the collapse
of the commercial paper markets sparked by
Daewoo’s default, firms achieved access to
financing through yet another source: the equity
market. With 1999 interest rates the lowest in
recent history, equity investment gained tremen-
dous momentum. Labor cost reductions in-
creased expectations of company profits. The
government deregulated foreign ownership of
Korean equities and simplified stock market
transactions. Foreign ownership of Korean equi-
ties reached 76.6 trillion won ($58.9 billion, 21.9
percent of total market value) in December 1999
and increased to 87.7 trillion won ($67.5 billion,
29.7 percent of total market value) by June
2000. Various types of new mutual funds were
allowed. Government funding to venture capital
companies, together with the global high-tech
boom, boosted stock prices (Figure 6 ). Patriotic
slogans were used to stimulate involvement in
the stock market, and some chaebols manipu-
lated their stock prices.21 In 1999, the Mathew
Korea Fund was the best-performing mutual
fund in the United States.
In 1999, capital raised by Korean corpora-
tions through equity issues reached 39.1 trillion
won ($30.1 billion), which was 23 percent of
commercial bank loans outstanding to firms.
Private firms’ total credit outstanding (bank
loans plus net commercial paper issues plus
equity issues) increased 19 percent. The rich
credit conditions of the private sector, together
with a household consumption boom following
the stock market boom, led Korea’s GDP to
grow a spectacular 10.6 percent. By the end of
1999, no one was talking about the downward
spiral of the economy.
Labor Markets
During a financial crisis, high nominal wages
have a depressing effect on output mainly
through greater financial pressures on firms
rather than through the conventional labor
channel (Bernanke and Carey 1996).22 An in-
flexible labor market can increase the probability
of bankruptcy for cash-poor firms and, in so
doing, deepen the downward spiral. Cole and
Ohanian (1999) show how rigid nominal wages
delayed the U.S. recovery from the Great De-
pression. During the Great Depression, working
hours were not increased and the real wage of
labor was not reduced. U.S. institutional factors
permitted monopolies and actually raised wages,
which in turn led to depressed employment,
output, and investment— thus, a slow recovery.
Korean labor markets responded drasti-
cally to the financial crisis and subsequent legal
and institutional changes. In February 1998, gov-
ernment, business, and workers reached the
Tripartite Agreement that facilitated employment
adjustment in the Korean labor market. At this
time, layoffs were officially codified under the
amended Labor Standard Act. The Legislation of
the Manpower Lease Act legalized the use of
temporary workers. Layoffs immediately follow-
ing enactment of the codes of the new Labor
Standard Act were minimal but signaled the
weakened power of the labor unions and the
advent of an easier employment adjustment.
Employment adjustments, including layoffs
and wage cuts, spread throughout the economy.
The unemployment rate shot up to 8.6 percent
Figure 6
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by early 1999 (Figure 7 ). Temporary positions
replaced many permanent ones. In May 1998,
workers with permanent jobs were 53.1 percent
of the total work force. By May 1999, they had
dropped to 47.5 percent.
Real employment cost per worker in the
manufacturing sector dropped 6.8 percent in
1998, or 2.1 percent in nominal terms (Figure 8 ).
The reduction of the employment cost per
worker reflects the nominal wage cuts, replace-
ment of permanent positions with temporary
ones, and decreased working hours (Table 3 ).
In the meantime, real value added per worker
increased 6.4 percent. As wage growth fell be-
hind productivity growth, the unit labor costs—
the ratio of hourly compensation to labor pro-
ductivity in manufacturing—dropped 20 percent
(28 percent in real terms) from 1997 to 2000. A
comparison with the U.S. unit labor cost in man-
ufacturing for the same period illustrates the
magnitude of Korea’s drop. The United States
had a 7.3 percent drop in real terms compared
with Korea’s 28 percent.
The reduction of labor costs helped the
companies with heavy debt survive while com-
mercial banks, which were traditionally the main
source of finance, were in trouble. Furthermore,
once the companies survived the crisis, their
higher profits as a result of lower labor costs
helped vitalize the equity market. The compa-
nies were then able to finance directly through
equities. In short, reduction of labor costs led
more private firms to survive during the period
of financial stress, resulting in a faster than
expected recovery.
What does this labor adjustment tell us
about the Korean labor market and the recovery
process? If we follow the financial-panic view,
we derive the hypothesis that the Korean labor
market was quite flexible before the financial
crisis, and the labor market adjustment was the
endogenous response of factor markets regain-
ing original equilibrium. However, if we use the
weak-fundamentals view, our hypothesis is that
the Korean labor markets were not flexible at
the onset of the financial crisis, but they became
more flexible and efficient due to legal and
institutional changes.
A flexible labor market enables a fast con-
vergence of wages and the marginal product of
labor when a shock causes a gap between the
two. Using this criterion, the hypothesis based
on the financial-panic view is easily negated.
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Table 3
Working Hours Index in Manufacturing
Year-over-year
Working Hours Index growth rate
1997 1Q 94.5 –2.2
2Q 98.7 –1.0
3Q 95.6 –.8
4Q 99.8 –.8
1998 1Q 89.4 –5.4
2Q 94.8 –4.0
3Q 94.5 –1.2
4Q 96.2 –3.7
1999 1Q 96.9 8.3
2Q 103.0 8.7
3Q 101.1 7.0
4Q 105.7 9.9
2000 1Q 100.3 3.5
2Q 99.9 –3.0
3Q 98.6 –2.4
4Q 102.2 –3.3
SOURCE: Korea Productivity Center.
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The unit labor cost dropped 28 percent in real
terms and has not risen significantly since the
financial crisis (Figure 9 ).23 The decline is evi-
dence that either Korean labor earned more
than it produced before the crisis or labor now
earns less than it produces, or both. None of
these interpretations support the financial-panic
view hypothesis. Even more evidence negates
the hypothesis: The ratio of employee compen-
sation to manufacturing sector income dropped
from 52.1 percent in 1997 to 41.7 percent in
1999. The National Income Account reveals this
labor-share trend. The overall labor share de-
clined from 53.4 percent in 1997 to 50.3 percent
in 1999 and 49.4 percent in 2000 (Figure 10 ). 
A flexible labor market mechanism does not
solely explain this significant procyclical be-
havior of labor shares. Because profit is more
volatile than wage to business cycles, it is natural
to expect the labor share to be countercyclical.
To examine the second hypothesis, based
on the weak-fundamentals view, we compare
the dollar-valued Korean unit labor cost and the
U.S. unit labor cost (Figure 11 ). We use the ratio
of trade surplus to trade volume between Korea
and the United States and set the base year so
that the trade surplus is close to zero when the
unit labor costs are the same in both countries.
The results show that Korean unit labor cost in
manufacturing increased dramatically after the
1987 citizens’ uprising and resulted in a trade
deficit against the United States. When we use
the number as a benchmark, it appears that 
the Korean labor was paid more than it pro-
duced during the 1990s until the financial crisis
erupted. This supports the weak-fundamentals
hypothesis that the Korean labor market was
not flexible or efficient before the crisis. How-
ever, the second hypothesis alone cannot ex-
plain why Korea’s unit labor cost is far lower
than that of the United States after the crisis.
We need to research further the over-
shooting of labor cost reductions. However, for
now we may consider the following two views
in explaining the phenomenon. First, the Korean
economy may have experienced a significant
structural change, which fundamentally shifted
its production function parameters after the cri-
sis. This change is reflected in the shift in labor
share. Legal and institutional changes after the
financial crisis, an investment boom in the infor-
mation technology industry, and a rapid change
in the composition of Korean export goods due
Figure 9
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to China’s export growth may have all con-
tributed to the structural change. Second, an
implicit social contract among laborers, con-
glomerates, and government may have caused
stagnating wages. In 1998, government employ-
ees returned 10 percent of their salary to the
government for the establishment of funds aid-
ing the unemployed. Private companies also cut
wages. When nominal wages are rigid, an im-
plicit social contract can increase the probability
of a firm’s survival during a crisis period and
can improve the employees’ welfare if the con-
tract is reasonably well honored after the crisis
is over. The 1998 wage cuts were accomplished
without serious social conflicts in a nation with
a history of notoriously militant labor unions.
Korean laborers could have possibly believed
that the prolabor government of Dae-jung Kim
would guarantee the implementation of the im-
plicit social contract after the crisis was over.
AFTER THE RECOVERY
Korea recovered from its currency market
panic after only a year as a result of the IMF
bailout, payment reprogramming, a tight mone-
tary policy, and the collapse of import demand.
The downward spiral of a credit crunch and
corporate defaults was contained remarkably as
companies faced lower labor costs and alterna-
tive financing sources. Having been the major
source of corporate funding, commercial bank
lending bounced back, thus helping to contain 
the downward spiral. The recovery of bank
lending to the private sector was a result of
capital injection by the government, unlimited
deposit insurance, and administrative interven-
tion to promote rollovers to ailing companies.
The government’s role was not limited to main-
taining commercial bank loans. It also fine-tuned
capital and equity markets.
The significant role of payment reprogram-
ming, labor adjustment, and government inter-
vention in the markets leads us to wonder
whether the Korean recovery process addressed
the possible sources of the crisis as the crisis
theories do.
After the crisis, the IMF strongly recom-
mended a floating exchange rate. Many econo-
mists believed that to prevent future currency
crises, there were only two exchange rate regime
choices, a floating exchange rate or a fixed ex-
change rate (currency board or dollarization).
But as the currency market panic subsided,
Korea returned to a crawling peg system in the
hope of keeping a trade surplus and a foreign
reserve surplus. In September 2000, the Bank 
of Korea had $92 billion of foreign reserves.
Foreign exchange intervention had become a
frequent government tool. Bond issues to steril-
ize the intervention increased to 64 trillion won
(13.2 percent of GDP) in 2000 from 22 trillion
won (4.8 percent of GDP) in 1997.
Even after the remarkable recovery, which
was in part accelerated by low labor and finan-
cial costs, the majority of Korean chaebols are
still not profitable. In 1999, eighteen of the
twenty-seven largest chaebols had financial
expenses that exceeded operating profits, and
seven of those had not been profitable for three
years.24
The accumulated loss in the corporate sec-
tor eventually is transferred to the financial 
sector in the form of nonperforming loans. The
government’s injection of more than 60 trillion
won (12 percent of 1999 GDP) into the financial
sector did not reduce the ratio of nonperform-
ing loans to total loans to a comfortable level.
When applying forward-looking standards, non-
performing loans in all financial institutions
were 14 percent in June 2000. It is expected that
the burden of government will continue to grow
unless the chaebols’ profitability improves dra-
matically.
Major Events Related to the Crisis
January 1997 Hanbo Steel defaults on its loans, the first of a string of major
corporate failures in 1997.
May 1997 Speculators attack Thailand’s baht.
July 1997 The Bank of Thailand announces a managed float of the baht and
asks the IMF for technical assistance.
August 1997 Indonesia abandons its managed exchange-rate regime.
October 1997 The Korean won begins to rapidly depreciate.
December 1997 The IMF approves a $21 billion loan for South Korea, part of a
bailout package that will total $58.4 billion.
Dae-jung Kim is elected president of South Korea.
January 1998 International creditor banks and the South Korean government agree
to exchange $24 billion of short-term debt for new loans with
staggered one- to three-year maturity dates.
The Korean government shuts down a third of its thirty merchant banks.
February 1998 Layoffs are officially codified under the amended Labor Standard Act
following the Tripartite Agreement reached by the government and
the business community. The Legislation of the Manpower Lease Act
legalizes the use of temporary workers.
August 1999 The South Korean government begins dismantling the second biggest
conglomerate in the country, Daewoo, which is in technical default.
September 1999 To avoid financial market seizure due to the collapse of the Daewoo
group, the Korean government organizes a commercial paper market
stabilization fund and raises $24 billion.
December 1999 President Dae-jung Kim announces the end of the currency crisis.
August 2001 Korea repays its $19.5 billion IMF loan.
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Problems with fiscal debt are also surfac-
ing. In precrisis days, the government had no
problems issuing bonds to inject money into the
financial sector and to provide unemployment
insurance. However, the crisis pushed up the
government debt to 40 percent of GDP in 2000.
With financial and corporate restructuring still in
progress, the debt will rise.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
What matters most in management of a
twin crisis is stabilizing the currency market and
containing the downward spiral. Korea was able
to manage the twin crisis, and Korea’s macro
variables—such as GDP growth, unemploy-
ment rate, inflation rate, and current account
deficit— improved tremendously shortly after
the crisis broke out.25 However, corporate profit-
ability and nonperforming loans have not ade-
quately improved, and the precrisis foreign ex-
change regime has returned. These were the
very conditions that were blamed for the crisis.
The Korean government did not wait for
market confidence to stabilize the financial 
markets. Instead, it aggressively controlled the
financial institutions to keep the country’s credit
system intact while pursuing gradual structural
reform. In this regard, the Korean government
did not thoroughly follow the policy implica-
tions of the weak-fundamentals view that focus
on prompt structural reform and recapitalization
of the financial sector. Companies were able to
survive the crisis partly because real wages did
not increase as much as labor productivity. The
labor market dynamics and fast recovery, how-
ever, do not necessarily support the recovery
feature of the financial-panic view. Korean labor
markets were not flexible and efficient before
the crisis, and labor adjustment overshot after
the financial crisis.
Korea’s recovery was only possible after 
it gained control of its currency crisis. Inter-
estingly, the recovery process affirms neither
the weak-fundamentals view nor the financial-
panic view. Although some weak fundamentals
were addressed after the crisis, the recovery was
in motion before the fundamental problems
were secured, and Korea continues to struggle
with structural weaknesses that were present
before the crisis. The financial-panic view also
does not adequately explain what took place in
Korea. Calming nervous investors so that con-
ditions would stabilize and return to precrisis
levels isn’t what happened. Conditions stabi-
lized, but they did not return to precrisis levels.
A combination of factors in crisis management
contained the downward spiral. Korea can
attribute much of its recovery to the creation of
alternative funding sources and labor adjustments.
NOTES
The authors would like to thank Gon-yung Park, Erwan
Quintin, Mark Wynne, and Carlos Zarazaga for their
insightful comments and suggestions.
1 Innumerable papers deal with the causes of the Asian
crisis, many of which can be found on Nouriel
Roubini’s home page, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/
~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html.
2 Eichengreen (1999), for example, argues, “Proposals
for reforming the international financial architecture
make sense only if they address the fundamental
causes of financial crises.”
3 Glick (1999) shows that a financial panic can occur 
as a result of weak financial fundamentals. We also
can construct a model illustrating that financial panic
leads to a collapse of the financial system. While
recognizing the possibility of “observational equiva-
lence,” we interpret each view as arguing that weak
fundamentals or financial panic, respectively, can
explain the majority of damage the economy suffered.
4 Zarazaga (1999) asks whether these theories are
examples of Monday morning quarterbacking, espe-
cially in the sense that the theories may not be useful
in forecasting future crises.
5 Goldstein (1998) and Krugman (1998) point out that
implicit guarantee of deposits in financial institutions of
emerging market economies invited too much capital
inflow. The crisis, or massive capital outflow, they
argue, happened when foreign investors suddenly
realized that their lending to local financial institutions
was not actually guaranteed. Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2000) argue that large prospective
deficits stemming from guarantees to failing financial
sectors tend to cause twin crises.
6 A downward spiral occurs when a recession forces
corporations to delay or default on their bank pay-
ments. As the amount of nonperforming loans rises,
banks’ cash flows are squeezed, forcing them to halt
new lending to illiquid corporations and to call in even
good loans to raise cash, all of which further deepen
the recession.
7 See Hunter (1999) on the history of chaebols, large
family-controlled industrial conglomerates, and the role
of capital allocation.
8 Borensztein and Lee (1999) empirically show that bank
and foreign loans were not directed to the relatively
more profitable industries in Korea (1970–1996).
9 Korea’s merchant banks specialize in short-term
corporate lending and have different regulations and
structures than commercial banks. Korean chaebols
typically financed their capital expenditures by borrow-
ing from commercial banks. However, they often
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financed their working capital by issuing promissory
notes. When suppliers needed paying, they turned to
merchant banks, which discounted the note and gave
them funds. Precrisis, the merchant banks generated
easy profits with their aggressive investments in South-
east Asia, Russia, and other emerging markets. How-
ever, these risky investments turned into a $3 billion
loss by late 1997.
10 The debt/equity ratio in Taiwan is about 120 percent, and
the norm for industrial countries is below 200 percent.
11 The maturity mismatches by Korean merchant banks
were riskier than the mismatch of other deposit
institutions because the number of depositors (foreign
lenders) was smaller than in other types of deposit
institutions, such as commercial banks.
12 Japan’s response supports the premise that Korea’s
liquidity problem was triggered by the contagion from
Southeast Asian countries rather than by intrinsic
problems within its economic structure.
13 The standby loan, $58.4 billion, was financed as
follows: IMF ($21.1 billion), Asian Development Bank
and World Bank ($14.2 billion), and others ($23.1
billion). The $23.1 billion was a “second line of defense”
from individual donor governments such as the United
States, Japan, and Europe, a small portion of which
was eventually delivered. See Lane et al. (1999).
14 Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that during a period
of high interest rates, exchange rate movement
depends on the strength of the offsetting movements
in the promised rate of return, the probability of
bankruptcy, and an increase in the risk premium. 
If high interest rates bring about investor confidence 
in the monetary authority, they can help stabilize the
exchange market. However, if the reverse takes place,
the exchange rate could be permanently weakened.
Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) analyze eighty countries
and show that high interest rates stabilize the
exchange rate following a currency crisis. However,
they find in their sample that the relationship between
high interest rates and exchange rate stability is insig-
nificant when a banking crisis follows a currency crisis.
15 The IMF money was not used to pay back private
foreign loans. Most of it was set aside as foreign
reserves and returned to the IMF by the end of 1999.
16 For example, the Korean case is strikingly different
from the case of Mexico. Mexico has experienced a
continued reduction of bank loans to the private sector
since the economy was struck by the crisis at the end
of 1994. The Mexican economy bounced back
because of the extension of foreign credit to the export
industry. Mexico’s GDP fell 6.2 percent during 1995,
but the GDP grew 5.2 percent in 1996 and 7 percent
in 1997. (See Krueger and Tornell 1999 regarding the
role of export to the recovery of Mexico’s economy.) 
As fresh loans dried up, nontradable sector companies
and households suffered severe credit deficiencies.
The downward spiral continued more than five years in
the nontradable sector while export industries flourished.
The result was an asymmetric recovery with a huge
gap between the tradable and nontradable sectors.
17 The Korean government reduced the guarantee to a
maximum of 50 million won per person beginning in
2001.
18 Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Korea.
19 Gruben, Koo, and Moore (1999) show how financial
liberalization can lead to supracompetition and risky
behavior in commercial banking sectors when sound
supervision does not exist.
20 Net commercial paper issue is equal to the value of
new issues minus the value of the redemption of
previously issued paper.
21 Hyundai Securities was eventually indicted for this
type of operation. It boosted its affiliates’ stock prices
by manipulating its mutual fund, the Buy Korea Fund.
22 In the conventional labor channel, high real wages
decrease equilibrium output as firms decide produc-
tion at the point where real wages equal the value of
the marginal product of labor.
23 The won unit labor cost has declined since 1991. 
The 1987 citizens’ uprising greatly strengthened the
bargaining power of Korea’s labor unions. As a result,
the unit labor cost accelerated. The decline of the
labor cost before the financial crisis can be attributed
to the slow adjustment process of labor markets to the
political shock of the uprising. It is also worth noting
that Korea’s dollar unit labor cost did not decline
before the crisis (Figure 11).
24 Source: Financial Supervisory Service.
25 Mild decline of the GDP deflator in 1999 and 2000
(Table 1) partly comes from the stabilization of the
Korean currency. The consumer price index does not
show deflation during the period.
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